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ABSTRACT	The	 Fundamental	 Review	 of	 the	 Trading	 Book	 sets	 the	 standard	 for	 the	 most	 recent	regulatory	 framework	 for	 minimum	 capital	 requirement	 within	 market	 risk.	 It	 will	 be	implemented	 gradually	 up	 until	 2019	 and	 will	 overhaul	 a	 major	 part	 of	 the	 current	regulation.	 More	 specifically	 it	 will	 cause	 financial	 institutions	 to	 estimate	 risk	 with	Expected	Shortfall	instead	of	Value-at-Risk	and	add	a	new	way	of	treating	varying	liquidity	among	assets.		This	 research	 looks	 into	 the	 new	 framework	 by	 evaluating	 three	 different	 indices.	 The	values	of	Expected	Shortfall	and	Value-at-Risk	are	compared	and	possible	effects	that	the	new	 framework	 has	 on	minimum	 capital	 requirement	 for	market	 risk	 are	 explored.	 To	estimate	 risk,	 both	 parametric	 estimation	 approaches	 as	 well	 as	 a	 non-parametric	estimation	approach	are	utilized.		In	order	to	calculate	the	minimum	capital	requirement,	the	 regulatory	 framework	 set	 out	 by	 the	 Basel	 Committee	 on	 Banking	 Supervision	 is	utilized.	To	evaluate	the	changes	in	the	regulatory	framework	of	the	Fundamental	Review	of	the	Trading	Book	we	compare	it	with	the	previous	regulations	Basel	I,	Basel	II	and	Basel	II.5.		The	study	finds	evidence	for	the	change	of	risk	measure	having	an	impact	on	the	estimated	riskiness	of	the	evaluated	assets.	What	the	study	finds	to	be	seemingly	most	important	in	the	new	regulatory	framework	is	the	inclusion	of	varying	liquidity	horizons.	Evidence	for	longer	liquidity	horizons	causing	the	capital	requirement	to	increase	relative	to	previous	regulation	is	presented.	Finally,	the	minimum	capital	requirement	under	the	Fundamental	Review	of	the	Trading	Book	show	apparent	signs	of	being	less	pro-cyclical.		
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CHAPTER	1:	INTRODUCTION	1.1	BACKGROUND	The	 Basel	 committee	 on	 Banking	 Supervision	 was	 founded	 in	 1974	 as	 a	 reaction	 to	instabilities	 in	 currency	 and	 banking	 markets	 with	 the	 goal	 to	 improve	 banking	supervision	globally	(BIS,	2016a).	Goodheart	(2012)	explains	that	the	Basel	Committee	on	Banking	Supervision	(BCBS)	was	founded	mainly	due	to	growing	globalization	of	financial	intermediation.	 Bank	 for	 International	 Settlements	 (2016a)	 explains	 that	 initially,	governors	from	10	different	nation’s	central	banks	made	up	the	committee	and	today	the	number	has	grown	to	consist	of	members	from	28	different	jurisdictions.		Bank	for	International	Settlements	(2011a)	states	that	the	financial	institutions	which	are	controlled	by	the	Basel	regulation	constitutes	of	all	internationally	active	banks.	These	will	be	referred	to	as	financial	institutions	throughout	this	thesis.		Since	 the	 Basel	 committee	 was	 founded	 three	 major	 publications	 have	 been	 brought	forward	regarding	capital	 adequacy	 in	 financial	 institutions,	namely	Basel	 I,	Basel	 II	 and	Basel	 III	 (BIS,	2016a).	 In	May	2012	a	new	document	was	published	by	 the	BCBS,	named	the	Fundamental	Review	of	the	Trading	Book	which	aims	to	strengthen	capital	standards	for	market	risk	even	further	(BIS,	2012).	Market	risk	is	defined	as	the	risk	of	losses	in	the	balance	 sheet,	 both	 off	 and	 on	 positions,	 arising	 from	 opposing	 movements	 in	 market	prices	(EBA,	2017).		According	to	Bank	 for	 International	Settlements	(2012),	The	Fundamental	Review	of	 the	Trading	 Book	 will	 overhaul	 previous	 regulation	 for	 determining	 market	 risk	 capital.	Instead	 of	 Value-at-Risk	 (VaR)	 being	 the	 basis	 for	 capital	 requirement	 calculations,	 the	new	 regulation	 will	 instead	 rely	 on	 Expected	 Shortfall	 (ES).	 In	 short,	 Value-at-Risk	determines	 the	potential	 for	big	 losses	with	 a	 set	 confidence	 interval,	whereas	ES	 is	 the	average	of	 these	 losses	over	 the	 set	 confidence	 level.	Value-at-Risk	does	not	 concern	 for	the	specific	amount	in	the	loss	over	this	confidence	level	meanwhile	ES	does,	which	as	the	recent	 financial	 crisis	 showed,	 makes	 a	 vast	 impact	 regarding	 risk	 management	 (BIS,	2014).	The	change	of	risk	measure	 is	due	to	the	weaknesses	that	Value-at-Risk	has	been	found	to	exhibit.	Hull	(2015)	explains	that	instead	of	a	Value-at-Risk	measure	with	a	99	%	confidence	 level	Expected	Shortfall	will	be	calculated	using	a	confidence	 level	of	97.5	%.	This	calculation	will	form	the	basis	for	market	risk	capital.	During	 the	recent	crisis	 it	became	apparent	 that	all	positions	 in	 the	 trading	book,	where	market	risk	is	traded,	were	in	fact	not	as	 liquid	as	they	were	treated	and	that	regulatory	
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capital	 has	 to	 be	 sufficient	 during	 periods	 of	 stress.	 Due	 to	 this	 the	 FRTB	 will	 include	varying	 liquidity	horizons	 for	different	positions	which	differs	 from	previous	regulations	where	all	positions	were	treated	as	equally	liquid	(BIS,	2012).	This	means	that	the	current	regulation	 which	 assumes	 that	 all	 positions	 have	 a	 10-day	 liquidity	 horizon	 will	 be	replaced	by	incorporating	different	liquidity	horizons	that	varies	depending	on	the	traded	instrument	 (BIS,	 2016b).	 In	 addition	 to	 this,	Expected	Shortfall	 has	 to	be	 calibrated	 to	 a	stressed	 period	 for	 the	 held	 portfolio	 in	 question.	 This	 calibration	 aims	 to	 reduce	 the	cyclicality	 of	 the	minimum	 requirement	 for	market	 capital	 that	 is	 seen	 empirically	 (BIS,	2012).	As	of	today	Basel	III	is	the	current	framework	for	credit	risk.	Simultaneously	there	exists	 a	 framework	 for	 market	 risk,	 Basel	 II.5	 that	 is	 now	 in	 transition	 into	 the	 new	framework,	The	Fundamental	Review	of	The	Trading	Book	(The	FRTB)	which	is	gradually	implemented	until	year	2019	(BIS,	2016b).			 	
3		
1.2	PREVIOUS	RESEARCH	According	 to	 the	 Bank	 for	 International	 Settlements	 (2014)	 some	 issues	 concerning	 the	new	regulation	have	arisen.	Banks	have	used	a	variety	of	different	approaches	to	calculate	Expected	Shortfall	(from	now	on	referred	to	as	ES)	and	many	have	found	it	challenging	to	implement	 the	 new	 amendment	 of	 liquidity	 horizons.	 Along	 with	 this	 there	 have	 been	uncertainties	in	how	to	determine	if	a	risk	factor	is	non-modelable	or	not.	If	a	risk	factor	is	non-modelable	there	are	no	available	“real”	prices	on	the	asset,	most	commonly	when	the	asset	 has	 less	 than	 24	 observations	 per	 year.	 The	 non-modelable	 risk	 factor	 is	 then	adjusted	to	project	at	least	as	conservative	values	as	the	ES	calibration	used	in	a	financial	institutions	 internal	 model.	 These	 are	 later	 summed	 up	 in	 order	 to	 give	 a	 total	 capital	charge	for	the	non-modelable	risks.		The	 Basel	 committee	 (2014)	 ran	 tests	 through	 a	 hypothetical	 portfolio	 exercise	 where	they	 used	 the	 Internal	 Model	 Approach	 (from	 now	 on	 referred	 to	 as	 IMA),	 which	determines	 the	 minimum	 capital	 requirement,	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 impact	 of	 the	FRTB.	The	main	objective	with	performing	the	hypothetical	portfolio	exercise	was	to	gain	an	understanding	of	the	different	challenges	that	could	be	associated	with	the	FRTB,	more	specifically	 with	 the	 IMA.	 The	 Basel	 committee	 performed	 tests	 together	 with	internationally	active	banks	that	were	already	using	the	IMA	to	estimate	risk.	Banks	that	only	 partially	 traded	 the	 different	 categories	 (equity,	 commodities,	 FX,	 interest	 rate	 and	credit	spread)	were	still	encouraged	to	participate	since	these	were	all	likely	to	be	affected	in	 some	 manner	 by	 the	 FRTB.	 	 In	 their	 research	 they	 state	 that	 the	 FRTB	 will	 cause	financial	 institutions	 to	 move	 to	 a	 single	 risk	 measure	 which	 is	 calculated	 at	 a	 lower	confidence	 level	 compared	 to	 the	 current	 regulation.	 This	 particular	 change	 is	 likely	 to	cause	the	capital	to	decrease.	At	the	same	time	the	new	risk	measure	averages	the	tail	of	the	 distribution	 and	 includes	 longer	 liquidity	 horizons.	 Both	 these	 latter	 mentioned	changes	are	expected	to	cause	the	capital	to	increase.	In	 a	 recent	 study	 by	 Bank	 for	 International	 Settlements	 (2015)	 it	 was	 found	 that	 the	market	risk	capital	will	increase	under	the	proposed	new	regulation.	In	an	impact	analysis	where	 44	 banks	 where	 evaluated	 the	 internally	 modeled	 market	 risk	 capital	 was	 on	average	54%	higher	compared	to	the	current	regulation.			Hull	(2015)	states	that	a	Value-at-Risk	(from	now	on	referred	to	as	VaR)	measure	with	a	confidence	level	of	99	%	will	approximately	be	equal	to	Expected	Shortfall	with	a	97.5	%	confidence	 level	 under	 a	normal	distribution.	He	however	points	 out	 that	 the	ES	 can	be	larger	 under	 a	 distribution	 with	 heavier	 tails.	 Dowd	 (2005)	 points	 out	 that	 empirical	
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returns	often	have	heavy	 tails,	where	Fama	(1965)	adds	 to	 this	and	argues	 that	 there	 is	empirical	evidence	for	financial	data	not	being	normally	distributed.		1.3	PURPOSE	Due	to	 the	Basel	regulation	having	an	 important	 impact	on	 the	 financial	 institutions	risk	management,	this	field	becomes	of	interest.	This	research	aims	to	look	into	the	effects	the	FRTB	 has	 on	 financial	 institution	 risk	 management,	 within	 market	 risk.	 The	 thesis	 will	perform	an	evaluation	of	how	the	FRTB	will	affect	risk	management	and	the	level	as	well	as	cyclicality	in	the	capital	charge	when	fully	implemented.	Firstly	 we	 will	 look	 into	 the	 differences	 between	 VaR	 and	 ES	 when	 a	 distribution	 with	heavier	 tails	 than	 the	normal	distribution	 is	 applied.	The	 following	 section	will	 examine	the	 effect	 of	 the	 new	 treatment	 of	 liquidity	 horizon,	 that	 different	market	 variables	 are	subject	to.	Finally	we	will	see	what	effect	the	change	of	risk	measure	and	the	addition	of	liquidity	horizons	will	have	on	the	capital	charge.																
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1.4	HYPOTHESIS	Based	on	the	empirical	evidence	for	financial	returns	having	fatter	tails	than	the	normal	distribution,	we	believe	that	ES	will	be	larger	than	VaR	when	using	a	t-distribution	compared	to	a	normal	distribution.	However	VaR	is	calculated	at	a	higher	confidence	level	which	is	likely	to	drive	the	value	of	VaR	upwards	compared	to	ES.	Concerning	the	inclusion	of	liquidity	horizons	we	believe	that	there	will	be	different	results	for	the	three	different	assets.	Since	S&P	500	carries	the	same	liquidity	horizon	in	the	FRTB	as	in	the	previous	regulation,	it	is	likely	that	there	will	not	be	any	major	discrepancies	between	the	value	of	VaR	and	ES.	Since	the	two	remaining	assets	carry	a	longer	liquidity	horizon	in	the	FRTB	it	is	plausible	to	assume	that	this	will	cause	ES	to	be	larger	than	VaR.		Since	there	are	several	differences	in	the	calculation	of	minimum	capital	requirement	in	the	different	regulations	we	expect	the	charges	to	vary	widely	in	all	the	assets.	Basel	II	relies	on	a	non-stressed	risk	metric	which	possibly	causes	the	capital	requirement	to	be	lower	compared	to	the	FRTB	and	Basel	II.5.	Since	Basel	II.5	includes	a	sVaR	and	a	non-stressed	VaR,	this	capital	charge	is	likely	to	be	high.	One	of	the	properties	within	the	FRTB	that	drives	the	capital	charge	upwards	is	the	inclusion	of	longer	liquidity	horizons.	Therefore	it	is	likely	that	the	capital	charge	for	the	most	illiquid	asset	will	be	high	while	the	capital	charge	for	the	more	liquid	assets	will	be	lower.	However	it	is	more	uncertain	how	the	fact	that	ES	takes	the	average	of	the	tail	losses	will	affect	the	value	of	the	ES-based	capital	charges	since	this	is	highly	dependent	on	the	sample.	The	same	uncertainty	also	applies	to	VaR	being	calculated	at	a	higher	confidence	level	than	ES.										
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CHAPTER	2:	THE	BASEL	REGULATION	
This	 section	 contains	 the	 background	 of	 Basel	 regulation	 and	 explains	 how	 the	 regulation	
has	developed	 since	 it	was	 first	 introduced.	The	 regulatory	 framework	 for	Basel	 I,	Basel	 II,	
Basel	II.5	and	the	FRTB	are	presented	in	this	section.		2.1	REGULATORY	FRAMEWORK	The	Basel	regulatory	frameworks	have	been	a	part	of	the	financial	institutions	since	1988	when	the	first	Basel	I	regulation	was	established	and	it	contained	guidelines	for	credit	risk.	The	main	purpose	of	the	Basel	frameworks	is	to	fortify	the	financial	markets	through	the	financial	 institutions	by	 creating	a	 strong	 regulatory	 foundation.	This	 results	 in	a	higher	probability	for	the	financial	institutions	to	absorb	and	handle	financially	stressed	periods	(BIS,	 1988).	 The	 Basel	 regulatory	 framework	 is	 provided	 by	 the	 Basel	 Committee	 on	Banking	 Supervision	 and	 is	 under	 continuous	development.	 It	 provides	 information	 and	understanding	about	 issues	 in	 form	of	supervisory	review	and	the	overall	quality	within	the	 financial	 institutions	 (BIS,	 2016b).	 The	Basel	 regulation	 that	was	 first	 established	 in	1988	 with	 Basel	 I	 have	 continuously	 developed	 into	 several	 updated	 versions	 of	 this	framework	 throughout	 the	years	 (BIS,	1988).	 In	1995	came	a	new	publication	 (Basel	 II)	that	complemented	the	Basel	I	accord	from	1988	adding	guidelines	regarding	market	risk	(BIS,	1995;	BIS	2016b).		
2.1.1	THE	STANDARDIZED	APPROACH	AND	INTERNAL	MODELS	APPROACH	IN	FRTB	In	the	Basel	framework	there	are	two	approaches	for	determining	capital	requirement	for	market	risk,	the	standardized	approach	(from	now	on	referred	to	as	SA)	and	the	internal	models	 approach	 (IMA).	 The	 SA	 is	 a	 simple	 and	 straightforward	 approach	 used	 when	measuring	 the	 capital	 requirement	 for	 a	 financial	 institution.	 The	 SA	 is	 based	 on	 three	main	components;	the	default	risk,	the	residual	risk	add-on	and	charges	under	sensitivity.	Since	 this	may	 not	 be	 a	 good	 fit	 for	 a	 specific	 financial	 institution	 and	 all	 market	 risks	cannot	 be	 captured	 by	 the	 SA,	 there	 is	 use	 of	 residual	 risk	 add-on	 to	 complement	 the	market	 risks	 that	may	 not	 have	 been	 sufficiently	 evaluated	 under	 the	 SA.	 However,	 the	majority	of	international	banks	use	the	IMA	(BIS,	2016b).	Considering	that	the	IMA	is	the	most	frequently	applied	method,	this	thesis	will	disregard	from	the	SA.		The	 IMA	 follows	 the	 same	 conditional	 requirements	 as	 the	 SA,	 there	 is	 however	 a	significant	difference.	Financial	institutions	that	use	the	IMA	have	their	own	approach	on	how	 to	 follow	 the	 requirements.	 The	 IMA	 is	 more	 closely	 watched	 by	 the	 supervisory	authority	 since	 these	 models	 are	 more	 complicated	 than	 the	 SA.	 The	 supervisory	authority’s	incentive	is	to	ensure	that	the	internal	models	used	for	measuring	market	risk	
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are	conceptually	sound	and	that	these	models	are	reliable	when	implemented.		In	addition	to	 the	 general	 criteria	 that	 are	 also	 covered	 by	 the	 SA,	 internal	 models	 are	 subject	 to	further	requirements	when	estimating	capital	requirements.	These	requirements	 include	an	 independent	 unit	 that	 values	 risk,	 regular	 back	 testing,	 rigorous	 stress-testing	programs	and	regularly	have	an	independent	party	review	the	risk	measurement	system	(BIS,	2016b).		2.2	PREVIOUS	REGULATION	The	first	Basel	amendment	stated	that	there	would	be	a	capital	requirement	of	8	%	of	the	risk	 weighted	 assets,	 where	 the	 minimum	 requirement	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 share	 of	 risk	weighted	 assets	 and	 not	 as	 a	 share	 of	 the	 nominal	 capital	 requirement	 (FI,	 2013).	 The	Risk-weighted	assets	were	determined	by	 the	 capital	 requirements	 for	both	market	 risk	and	operational	risk	and	adding	the	sum	of	risk-weighted	assets	for	credit	risk	as	well.	The	market	 risk	 model	 was	 based	 on	 VaR	 at	 a	 99%,	 one-tailed	 confidence	 interval	 with	 a	minimum	holding	period	of	10	days	in	Basel	I	and	Basel	II	(BIS,	2005).		There	have	been	a	 lot	of	 criticism	that	VaR	has	been	 too	reliant	on	normal	distributions	and	 also	 that	 all	 held	 positions	 were	 considered	 easy	 to	 liquidate	 in	 Basel	 II,	 that	 was	clearly	seen	as	insufficient	and	naïve	after	the	financial	crisis.	This	lead	to	Basel	II.5	where	regulators	attempted	to	create	a	system	that	compensated	for	these	specific	shortcomings.	In	Basel	 II.5	 the	market	risk	 framework	was	specifically	 targeted	with	 these	regulations.	The	 element	 with	 most	 impact	 within	 Basel	 II.5	 was	 the	 requirement	 of	 calculating	 a	stressed	 VaR,	 (sVaR).	 The	 sVaR	 drove	 the	 risk	 weighted	 assets	 to	 a	 higher	 level	 and	increased	 the	 capital	 requirements	 by	 a	 factor	 of	 between	 two	 to	 three	 (Armour	 et	 al,	2016).	According	to	Mckinsey	(2012)	the	higher	capital	requirement	makes	the	financial	system	 safer.	 However	 it	 can	 be	 deemed	 as	 a	 blunt	 instrument	 from	 a	 modeling	perspective	and	because	of	 this,	 financial	 institutions	are	 in	need	of	 refined	risk	models.	Robobank	 (2016)	 clarified	 that	 Basel	 II.5	 concerns	 market	 risk	 meanwhile	 Basel	 III	concerns	credit	risk,	which	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis.	However	it	is	notable	to	add	that	Basel	III	will	increase	capital	requirements	even	further	in	credit	risk,	adding	on	the	8	%	capital	requirement	with	increased	Core	Equity	Tier	1	capital	(CET1),	a	counter-cyclical	capital	Buffer	(CCCB)	and	capital	conservation	buffer	(CCB).					
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2.2.1	QUANTITATIVE	STANDARDS	FOR	BASEL	I,	II	AND	BASEL	II.5	In	1995	an	amendment	 to	 the	Basel	 I	 regulation	was	published	 and	aimed	 to	 revise	 the	regulation	 regarding	 market	 risk.	 This	 amendment	 required	 financial	 institutions	 to	calculate	 their	 capital	 charge	 using	 a	 VaR-model.	With	 this	 amendment,	 the	 capital	was	determined	as	the	higher	of	the	previous	days	VaR	or	the	average	of	the	daily	VaR	over	the	preceding	 60-days	 (eq.	 1).	 The	VaR	was	 required	 to	 be	 computed	 at	 a	 99	%	 confidence	level	with	a	minimum	holding	period	of	10-days	(BIS,	1995).	According	to	Hull	(2015)	this	became	known	as	the	“1996	Amendment”	and	the	capital	requirement	for	market	risk	in	Basel	II	remained	unchanged	since	the	1996	amendment.	Considering	that	Basel	I	with	the	1996	amendment	and	Basel	II	value	market	risk	in	the	same	manner,	we	will	refer	to	both	these	as	Basel	II.	In	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis	 that	 started	 in	 2007,	 the	 1996	 amendment	 was	accused	of	overlooking	some	key	risks	concerning	market	risk.	During	the	crisis	the	losses	in	 a	majority	 of	 financial	 institutions	 trading	 books	 had	 exceeded	 the	minimum	 capital	requirement.	 As	 a	 response	 to	 this,	 sVAR	 was	 introduced	 to	 the	 regulatory	 capital	requirement	(BIS,	2011b).	According	to	Hull	 (2015)	the	sVaR	 is	a	VaR	calibrated	to	a	12	month	 period	 of	 financial	 stress.	 This	 change	 has	 become	 known	 as	 Basel	 II.5.	 An	important	 property	 of	 Basel	 II.5,	 is	 according	 to	 Bank	 for	 International	 Settlements	(2011b),	to	reduce	pro-cyclicality	of	the	minimum	capital	requirement	for	market	risk.		For	Basel	II	and	II.5	the	VaR	calculation	should	be	performed	daily	and	a	minimum	holding	period	of	10	days	should	be	considered.	A	confidence	level	of	99	%	is	to	be	used.	However,	no	particular	model	is	required	to	be	used	(BIS,	2011b;	BIS,	1995).	The	capital	requirement	for	Basel	I,	Basel	II	and	Basel	II.5	is	as	follows:	Basel	II	 																		𝐶! = 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑉𝑎𝑅!!!,𝑚! ∗ 𝑉𝑎𝑅!"#)	+	SRC	 																																(1)	Where	SRC	is	a	specific	capital	charge	for	idiosyncratic	risk	based	on	the	specific	financial	institution.	The	𝑚! 	is	a	multiplying	factor	with	a	value	set	between	3	to	4	and	relates	to	the	ex-post	performance	of	the	IMA	model	within	the	financial	institutions.	Depending	on	the	performance	financial	institutions	may	be	required	to	“add”	to	the	multiplying	factor	(BIS,	2011b).	 This	 also	 includes	𝑚! 	(eq.	 2)	 where	𝑚!  also	 is	 considered	 in	 Basel	 II.5.	 The	𝑉𝑎𝑅!!! is	the	previous	day´s	VaR	and	the	𝑉𝑎𝑅!"#	is	the	average	of	VaR	the	past	60	days.		
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Basel	II.5	
											𝐶! = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑉𝑎𝑅!!!,𝑚! ∗ 𝑉𝑎𝑅!"# +𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑠𝑉𝑎𝑅!!!,𝑚! ∗ 𝑠𝑉𝑎𝑅!"# 	 	(2)	Since	sVaR	is	likely	to	be	equal	or	greater	than	VaR,	Basel	II.5	(eq.	2)	is	likely	to	cause	the	capital	requirement	to	be	at	least	doubled	compared	to	Basel	II	(Hull,	2015).		In	Basel	II	and	Basel	II.5	financial	institutions	are	allowed	to	calculate	the	one	day	VaR	and	thereafter	scale	the	one	day	estimate	using	the	square	root	of	time.	This	process	generates	a	10-day	estimate	for	VaR.	2.3	THE	FUNDAMENTAL	REVIEW	OF	THE	TRADING	BOOK	-	FRTB	The	development	of	a	more	sophisticated	system	has	 formed	the	 latest	Basel	accord,	 the	FRTB.	The	FRTB	is	a	new	way	for	financial	institutions	to	still	have	a	flexible	way	of	using	internal	models	but	still	maintain	a	minimum	standard	when	 they	calculate	 their	capital	charge	respectively	(Armour	et	al,	2016).			The	first	and	foremost	new	standard	is	ES,	which	is	replacing	VaR	as	the	primary	way	of	measuring	 risk.	ES	 is	 to	be	 computed	on	a	daily	basis	 for	 the	 entire	 internal	model	 as	 a	whole	within	the	financial	institution.	Added	to	this	will	be	the	trading	books	and	trading	desks.	These	must	also	be	computed	daily,	 if	 they	are	 to	be	 included	within	 the	 internal	model.	ES	will	be	based	on	a	one-tailed	confidence	level	of	97.5	%	comparable	with	a	99	%	VaR	that	were	the	previous	regulatory	standard	(BIS,	2016b).	
2.3.1	TRADING	BOOK	A	 trading	 book	 consists	 of	 instruments	 that	 account	 for	 the	 value	 of	 all	 assets	 that	 are	being	held.	 The	 instruments	 are	broadly	depicted	 as	 financial	 instruments,	 commodities	and	 foreign	 exchange	 where	 financial	 instruments	 include	 both	 derivatives	 and	 cash	instruments.	 It	 must	 be	 clear	 what	 procedures	 and	 policies	 a	 financial	 institution	 have	when	determining	which	 instruments	 to	 include	 in	 the	 specific	 trading	book.	Depending	on	what	 instruments	 that	are	 included	or	excluded	 from	the	 trading	book	will	affect	 the	calculation	 of	 the	 capital	 required	 by	 regulations.	 There	 is	 also	 a	 requirement	 that	 the	financial	institutions	must	conduct	ongoing	evaluations	of	the	instruments	that	are	left	out	of	 the	 trading	 book	 to	 be	 able	 to	 assess	 if	 the	 assets	 should	 be	 considered	 within	 the	trading	book.	However	 there	are	 restrictions	whether	 to	move	 instruments	between	 the	trading	book	and	the	banking	book	after	the	initial	placement	of	an	asset.	Since	the	trading	book	 attracts	 higher	 market	 risk	 capital	 than	 the	 banking	 book	 there	 will	 be	 strict	regulation	 between	 these	 due	 to	 the	 incentives	 for	 arbitrage	 between	 the	 books	 (BIS,	2016b).	The	regulatory	system	 is	established	so	 that	 switching	books	can	be	allowed	by	
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the	appointed	supervisor,	but	should	only	be	considered	in	extraordinary	circumstances.	An	 example	 of	 this	would	 be	when	 a	 financial	 institution	 restructures	 the	 organization.	This	may	affect	 the	present	 valuation	of	 assets.	 This	 results	 in	 that	 financial	 institutions	must	hold	instruments	in	the	trading	books	that	are	subject	to	clear	and	specific	policies	and	 procedures	 that	 ensure	 that	 the	 financial	 institutions	 actively	 ensures	 their	 risk	management	in	assets	held.	(BIS,	2016b).	
2.3.2	TRADING	DESK	A	trading	desk	is	a	group	of	traders	or	trading	accounts.	A	trading	desk	must	be	equipped	with	a	well-defined	business	strategy	where	primary	activities	and	trading	strategies	are	stated	 (BIS,	 2016b).	 For	 selected	 desks	 that	 are	 permitted	 to	 use	 the	 IMA	 should	 all	 be	included	in	the	internal	model	when	calculating	ES.	This	will	be	the	basis	of	the	internally	modelled	 capital	 charge	 (IMCC)	where	 the	 financial	 institutions	will	 have	 free	 rein	 from	supervisory	 restraints	 when	 classifying	 the	 cross-class	 correlations	 (IMCC(C)),	 which	 is	considered	the	unconstrained	capital	charge.	IMCC(𝐶!)		 is	calculated	by	taking	the	partial	ES	charges	 from	the	risk	 factors	 (equity	risk,	exchange	rates-	and	 interest	 rate	risk)	and	are	summed	up	to	IMCC(𝐶!)	that	 is	considered	the	constrained	capital	charge.	These	two	combined	are	the	basis	of	the	actual	capital	charge	for	a	financial	institution	and	the	two	approaches,	 IMCC(C)	 and	 IMCC(𝐶!)	carry	 equal	weight	 in	 the	 IMCC,	 that	 is	 based	 on	 the	average	of	IMCC(C)	and	IMCC(𝐶!).	The	formulas	for	the	IMCC	are	the	following:		
𝐼𝑀𝐶𝐶 𝐶 =  𝐸𝑆!,! ∗ !"!,!!"!,!      (3)                𝐴𝑛𝑑                    𝐼𝑀𝐶𝐶 𝐶! =  𝐸𝑆!,!,! ∗ !"!,!,!!"!,!,!	 					(4)		These	equations	for	constrained	and	unconstrained	ES	values	summarize	into:		
𝐼𝑀𝐶𝐶 =  𝜌 𝐼𝑀𝐶𝐶 𝐶 + (1 − 𝜌)( 𝐼𝑀𝐶𝐶(𝐶!))!!!! 	 	 						(5)		Based	 on	 the	 assumptions	 and	 restrictions	 made	 in	 the	 thesis,	𝐸𝑆!,! 	(all	 risks	 in	 the	current	portfolio)	 and	𝐸𝑆!,! 	(reduced	 risks	 in	 the	 current	portfolio)	 are	 the	 same,	which	makes	the	difference	in	IMCC(C)	and	IMCC(𝐶!)	to	be	𝐸𝑆!,!	and	𝐸𝑆!,!,! ,	which	are	calibrated	to	a	stressed	period.	The	period	under	stress	is	required	to	be	the	same	when	computing	the	different	risk	classes	(𝐸𝑆!,!,!)	and	the	portfolio	𝐸𝑆!,!.	Since	both	IMCC(C)	and	IMCC(𝐶!)	
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reduces	to	the	same	value	the	ρ	will	not	make	a	difference	when	calculating	the	IMCC	in	the	 thesis.	 BIS	 (2016b)	 has	 decided	 that	 ρ	 shall	 take	 on	 the	 value	 of	 0.5	 in	 the	 internal	model	 and	by	 that	put	 equal	weights	on	 the	 constrained	and	unconstrained	model.	This	makes	 the	 model	 to	 consider	 both	 diversification	 in	 IMCC(C)	 and	 the	 non-diversified	IMCC(𝐶!).	When	 IMCC(C)	and	 IMCC(𝐶!)	are	defined,	 the	capital	 requirement	can	 then	be	solved	 for	the	specific	financial	institution.	The	capital	charge	is	calculated	by	the	maximum	ES	in	the	most	recent	observation	and	also	by	taking	the	average	of	the	previous	60	days	of	ES	and	scaling	 the	 average	 by	 a	 multiplier	 (𝑚!).	 This	 multiplier	 is	 set	 between	 1.5-2.0	 and	depending	 on	 the	 risk	 level	 within	 the	 financial	 institution	 it	 can	 be	 changed	 by	supervisory	 authorities.	 Based	 on	 ex	 post	 performance	 the	 financial	 institution	 may	 be	forced	to	“add”	onto	the	multiplying	effect	to	maintain	a	stable	predictability.	This	is	done	by	back-testing	VaR	with	a	 confidence	 level	of	 the	99	%	where	all	 risk	 factors	are	 to	be	included	 (BIS,	 2016b).	 In	 the	 thesis	 the	 multiplier	 basis	 of	 1.5	 will	 be	 used	 where	 no	assumptions	 on	 held	 assets	 will	 be	 made.	 This	 is	 reasonable	 since	 we	 look	 at	 indices	exchange	rates	isolated	from	other	risk	factors.		Each	 financial	 institution	 that	 is	 governed	by	 the	Basel	 regulation	must	 on	 a	 daily	 basis	meet	the	capital	requirement	according	to	the	following	formula:			 					𝐶! = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑀𝐶𝐶!!! + 𝑆𝐸𝑆!!!;𝑚! ∗ 𝐼𝑀𝐶𝐶!"# + 𝑆𝐸𝑆!"# 	 					(6)		Where	𝐼𝑀𝐶𝐶!!!	as	previously	stated	reduces	 to	a	stressed	ES	and	𝐼𝑀𝐶𝐶!"#	reduces	to	an	average	of	the	preceding	60	stressed	ES.	𝑆𝐸𝑆!!!	and	𝑆𝐸𝑆!"!		(in	eq.	6)	are	non-modelable	factors	 	 with	 stressed	 capital	 add-on	 within	 the	 trading	 desks	 that	 are	 eligible	 to	incorporate	financial	instruments	within	the	trading	book.	These	will	reduce	to	zero	since	the	risk	factors	in	the	thesis	are	modelable	factors.	The	thesis	will	therefore	consider	the	reduced	capital	requirement	formula:		 				𝐶! = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑀𝐶𝐶!!!;𝑚! ∗ 𝐼𝑀𝐶𝐶!"# 	 	 					(7)		
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The	 total	 capital	 charge	 that	 the	 financial	 institutions	must	 hold	 is	 based	 on	 the	 capital	requirements	from	the	selected	trading	desks	that	use	the	IMA	and	the	other	trading	desks	that	use	the	standardized	capital	charge.	Together	they	form	the	formula:		 														𝐴𝐶𝐶 =  𝐶! + 𝐷𝑅𝐶 + 𝐶! 	 	 	 					(8)		ACC	represents	the	total	capital	requirement,	𝐶!	is	the	capital	charge	based	on	the	trading	desks	that	use	the	IMA,	𝐶! 	is	the	capital	charge	for	the	risk	factors	that	cannot	be	modeled	after	the	IMA.	Lastly	DRC	is	the	default	risk	charge	model.	(BIS,	2016b).	In	this	thesis	we	will	only	look	into	a	simplified	IMA	approach	which	will	only	include	the	𝐶!.	This	will	give	us	 an	 idea	 of	 how	 the	 FRTB	will	 affect	 financial	 institutions	 risk	management	 since	we	consider	the	factor	within	the	model	that	is	most	risk	prone	and	where	there	is	most	likely	to	be	big	losses.	
2.3.3	QUANTITATIVE	STANDARDS	WITHIN	THE	FRTB	Financial	institutions	stand	out	in	the	way	that	they	must	show	that	capital	requirements	are	met	 on	 a	 continuous	 basis,	 including	 forward	 sales	 and	 purchases.	 They	 are	 tested	through	a	supervisor	authority	by	different	measures	to	ensure	that	financial	institutions	do	not	exceed	their	market	risk	capacity.	This	mainly	concerns	larger	banks	of	which	the	majorities	are	using	the	IMA.	Using	the	IMA	gives	financial	institutions	a	way	to	maintain	a	strategic	 management	 system	 that	 is	 structured	 after	 strengths,	 something	 that	 the	 SA	may	 not	 be	 able	 to	 apply	 in	 the	 same	 way.	 If	 a	 financial	 institution	 fails	 to	 meet	 set	requirements	 for	market	risk	 the	authority	will	make	sure	 the	 financial	 institution	 takes	immediate	action	to	correct	the	offset	in	market	risk.	The	capital	requirements	for	market	risk	are	as	for	operational-	and	credit	risk	consolidated	on	a	worldwide	basis.	This	allows	financial	 institutions	 to	use	 trading	books	 that	 include	 just	 the	 short	 and	 long	positions,	independent	on	where	the	assets	are	booked.	The	trading	books	must	be	valued	every	day	and	recognize	the	change	of	value	in	terms	of	losses	and	profit	(BIS,	2016b).					
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2.3.4	LIQUIDITY	HORIZON	One	 of	 the	 more	 important	 regulatory	 differences	 within	 the	 FRTB	 is	 the	 liquidity	horizons.	 The	 liquidity	 horizon	 is	 to	 be	 calculated	 based	 on	ES	 that	 has	 a	 base	 liquidity	horizon	 of	 10	 days	 which	 can	 be	 scaled	 depending	 on	 the	 instruments	 liquidity.	 The	liquidity	 horizons	 range	 from	 10	 days,	 which	 concerns	 the	 most	 liquid	 assets	 such	 as	stocks	 to	120	days	concerning	 for	example	credit	spread	volatility	 (Appendix).	 It	will	no	longer	be	permitted	to	use	the	square	root	of	time	when	scaling	the	risk.	The	square	root	of	time	is	a	way	to	scale	a	one-day	holding	period	up	to	a	10-day	holding	period,	as	is	the	prescribed	horizon	in	Basel	II	(BIS,	2011b).	The	ES,	which	includes	varying	liquidity	horizons,	will	be	calculated	according	to	equation	9.		
																𝐸𝑆 =  (𝐸𝑆! 𝑃 )! +  𝐸𝑆!(𝑃, 𝑗) (!"!! !"!!!)!)!!!!! 		 	 		(9)	
	Where	each	 liquidity	horizon	 is	 calculated	separately	meanwhile	all	 the	other	assets	are	held	 constant,	 starting	 with	 the	 most	 liquid	 assets	 of	 10-days	 and	 lastly	 the	 120-day	liquidity	horizon.	Table	1	show	how	the	assets	are	given	different	liquidity	horizons,	where	a	horizon	of	10-days	is	given	to	the	most	liquid	assets	meanwhile	120-days	are	given	to	the	most	illiquid	assets.		
Table	1.	Liquidity	Horizons	
	
	
Category	 Liquidity	Horizon	(𝐿𝐻!)	1	 10	2	 20	3	 40	4	 60	5	 120	Source:	BIS	(2016b)	 		
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In	 equation	 9,	 ES	 is	 the	 expected	 shortfall	 that	 is	 based	 on	 the	 new	 regulatory	 adjusted	time	horizon	liquidity	that	is	based	on	10	days,	T.	𝐸𝑆!(𝑃)	is	the	portfolio	and	its	positions	that	 are	 concerned	with	 shocks	 that	 can	offset	 the	 risk	 factors.	𝐸𝑆! 𝑃, 𝑗 	is	 the	 subset	 of	risk	 factors	 that	 can	 shock	 the	 different	 positions,	𝑝! 	when	 the	 other	 factors	 are	 held	constant.		
2.3.5	STRESSED	PERIOD	IN	FRTB	The	 FRTB	 improves	 the	 Basel	 II.5	 reform	 that	 addressed	 the	 shortcomings	 during	 the	financial	crisis	when	the	 trading	books	exposure	was	undercapitalized	by	using	stressed	periods	as	a	measurement	(BIS,	2012).	ES	must	also	be	calibrated	to	the	most	stressed	12-month	 period	 based	 on	 the	 financial	 institutions	 current	 portfolio.	 The	 stressed	 period	should	include	the	time	period	in	which	the	largest	loss	for	the	portfolio	occurred.	When	finding	 the	 stressed	 period,	 data	 from	 2007	 and	 forward	 must	 be	 used	 and	 each	observation	has	to	be	given	equal	weights.	This	is	done	by	using	a	more	indirect	approach,	where	 the	 risk	 factors	 used	 are	 reduced	 and	 must	 be	 relevant	 for	 the	 currently	 held	portfolio.	This	reduced	set	of	risk	factors	must	be	approved	by	the	appointed	supervisory	authority	 and	must	 show	valid	 for	 a	 longer	period	of	historical	data.	The	 reduced	 set	of	risk	 factors	must	 also	when	 compared	with	 the	 full	ES	model	be	able	 to	 explain	at	 least	75%	of	the	fully	specified	ES	model	when	measured	over	a	12	week	period.	The	internal	model	that	is	to	be	used	when	calculating	ES	is	not	required	to	be	based	on	a	specific	ES-model,	 as	 long	as	 it	 follows	previously	 stated	 criteria.	However	 the	 financial	 institutions	must	meet	the	capital	requirement	on	a	daily	basis	(BIS,	2016b).	Instead	of	doubling	the	capital	requirement,	as	Basel	II.5	does,	using	a	blunt	instrument	to	solve	an	advanced	market	such	as	the	financial	market	as	discussed	by	Mckinsey	(2012),	the	 FRTB	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 liquidity	 in	 the	 different	 assets	 as	 a	 simple,	 but	sophisticated	instrument	(BIS,	2012).	
2.3.6	SUMMARY	OF	THE	FRTB	The	 FRTB	 will	 be	 the	 new	 framework	 for	 financial	 institutions,	 successively	 implanted	until	2019.	Three	major	changes	are	therefore	central	in	the	FRTB.	First	and	foremost	the	regulation	 requires	 financial	 institutions	 to	 use	 ES	 instead	 of	 VaR	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 the	calculation.	Secondly	assets	will	be	treated	as	having	different	liquidities	depending	on	the	instrument,	 compared	 to	 previous	 regulation	 where	 all	 assets	 carry	 the	 same	 liquidity.	Lastly,	the	capital	requirement	will	be	based	on	a	single	risk	metric	calibrated	to	a	stressed	period.			 	
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CHAPTER	3:	RISK	ESTIMATION	METHODS	
This	 section	 contains	 a	 theoretical	 background	 regarding	 the	 definitions	 and	 estimation	
approaches	of	the	two	risk	measures	Expected	Shortfall	and	Value-at-Risk	that	is	used	in	the	
research.	Information	regarding	how	the	estimation	approaches	are	used	can	be	found	in	the	
Methodology	chapter.	3.1	VALUE-AT-RISK	Due	to	being	perceived	as	a	concise	measure	of	downside	risk,	Value-at-Risk	has	become	the	 most	 popular	 technique	 in	 risk	 management	 (Chu-Hsiung	 &	 Shan-Shan,	 2006).	Intuitively	VaR	can	be	defined	as	summarizing	the	worst	loss	over	a	specific	time	horizon	for	a	given	confidence	level	(Jorion,	2001).	When	using	this	measure	we	are	interested	in	being	able	 to	 say	 that	we	are	certain,	 to	 some	degree,	 that	we	will	not	 lose	more	 than	a	specific	amount	of	money	for	a	given	time	period	(Hull,	2015).		According	to	Nilsson	(2014)	VaR	can	mathematically	be	defined	according	to	equation	10.																																																	𝑉𝑎𝑅!(𝐿) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑙 ∶ Pr 𝐿 > 𝑙 ≤ 1 − 𝛼 		 	 			(10)		VaR	can	therefore	be	described	as	the	smallest	loss	(𝑙)	that	causes	the	probability	of	future	loss	 in	a	portfolio	(𝐿)	 larger	than	𝑙,	 to	be	 less	or	equal	to	1 − 𝛼.	Where	𝐿	is	 the	stochastic	variable.		For	 a	 continuous	 loss	 distribution	 the	 definition	 of	 VaR	 can	 be	 restated	 according	 to	equation	11.		
																																																	𝑉𝑎𝑅! 𝐿 = 𝑃𝑟 𝐿 > 𝑉𝑎𝑅! 𝐿 = 1 − 𝛼	 	 				(11)		Acerbi	 and	 Tasche	 (2001)	 argue	 that	 considering	 that	 VaR	 simply	 is	 a	 threshold,	 the	measure	is	indifferent	about	the	losses	that	can	occur	beyond	this	threshold.	They	further	argue	that	because	of	this,	portfolios	with	identical	VaR	can	carry	different	risk.		Yamai	and	Yoshiba	(2005)	state	this	problem	in	perhaps	a	clearer	manner.	They	state	that	VaR	does	not	regard	losses	beyond	the	VaR	level	and	that	the	measure	is	not	coherent.	The	lack	of	coherency	in	VaR	means,	according	to	Acerbi	and	Tasche	(2002)	that	the	risk	of	a	portfolio	
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can	be	 larger	 than	 the	 sum	of	 the	 individual	positions	 risk	 that	 the	portfolio	 consists	of.	Due	 to	VaR	not	being	sub-additive	 it,	 in	some	cases,	punishes	diversification	rather	 than	rewarding	 it	 and	 due	 to	 this	 a	 new	 risk	 measure	 advanced,	 namely	 Expected	 Shortfall	(Harmantzis	et	al.,	2006).	3.2	EXPECTED	SHORTFALL	As	an	alternative	to	VaR,	Expected	Shortfall	has	been	found	to	be	a	coherent	risk	measure	that	can	dominate	VaR	(Tasche,	2002).	After	the	notion	of	coherency	had	been	introduced	ES	 was	 brought	 forward.	 This	 was	 due	 to	 ES	 both	 being	 both	 coherent	 and	 easy	 to	compute	 (Acerbi	 &	 Tasche,	 2002).	 	 According	 to	 Hull	 (2015)	 ES	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 the	expected	loss	during	some	specified	time	period	conditional	on	the	loss	being	larger	than	a	specified	percentile	of	the	loss	distribution.		Considering	this	definition,	ES	can	be	thought	of	the	expected	loss	in	dire	circumstances.		ES	 can	 according	 to	 Dowd	 (2005)	 formally	 be	 described	 as	 the	 average	 VaR	 for	 all	confidence	 levels	 equal	 to	 or	 above	 the	 chosen	 confidence	 level	 (α).	 We	 can	 therefore	calculate	 ES	 as	 the	 average	 of	 VaR	 at	 confidence	 level	 α	 to	 one.	 The	 mathematical	definition	can	therefore	be	stated	as	in	equation	12.			
				𝐸𝑆!(𝐿) = !!!! 𝑉𝑎𝑅! 𝐿 𝑑𝑥!! 	 	 			(12)		Acerbi	 and	 Tasche	 (2001)	 argue	 that	 sub-additivity	 is	 an	 essential	 quality	 in	 a	 risk	measure	when	it	comes	to	both	capital	adequacies	in	banking	supervision	and	in	portfolio	optimization.	 They	 also	 argue	 that	 ES	 is	 a	more	 simple	 concept	 than	 VaR	 and	 that	 any	financial	institution	that	already	computes	VaR	easily	can	switch	to	calculating	ES.		3.3	PARAMETRIC	APPROACHES	When	using	a	parametric	approach,	 risk	 is	 estimated	by	 fitting	probability	 curves	 to	 the	data	at	hand.	The	risk	measures	that	are	intended	to	be	calculated	can	be	inferred	from	the	fitted	probability	curve.	This	of	course	gives	rise	to	problems	if	the	density	function	does	not	 form	 a	 suitable	 fit	 for	 the	 data.	 However	 parametric	 approaches	 are	 deemed	 to	 be	more	 powerful	 than	 non-parametric	 approaches	 due	 to	 the	 additional	 information	contained	in	the	density	function	(Dowd,	2005).			
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3.3.1	NORMAL	DISTRIBUTION	The	normal	distribution	only	needs	two	parameters,	the	mean	and	the	standard	deviation.	This	feature	makes	the	normal	distribution	attractive	when	estimating	VaR	and	ES	(Dowd,	2005).		If	the	normal	distribution	is	applied	the	VaR	and	ES	can	be	calculated	using	the	following	equations.			 	 												𝑉𝑎𝑅! = µ + 𝜎𝑧! 	 	 																															(13)	
													𝐸𝑆! = µ + 𝜎 !(!!)!!! 	 	 																																(14)		Where	µ	and	σ	are	the	estimates	for	the	mean	and	standard	deviation	of	the	 losses.	𝑧! 	is	the	standard	normal	variate	which	corresponds	to	the	confidence	level	(α)	that	is	chosen.	Finally,	 Φ(zα)	 is	 the	 value	 of	 the	 standard	 normal	 density	 function	 for	 the	 chosen	confidence	level.		The	estimates	of	VaR	and	ES	can	be	stated	for	a	certain	holding	period	by	multiplying	the	mean	 and	 the	 variance	 by	 the	 length	 of	 the	 holding	 period	 and	 the	 square	 root	 of	 the	length	 of	 the	 holding	 period	 respectively.	 By	 doing	 this	 we	 arrive	 at	 the	 following	formulas.			
						𝑉𝑎𝑅!! = ℎµ + ℎ𝜎𝑧! 	 																																																										(15)	
					𝐸𝑆!! = ℎµ + ℎ𝜎 !(!!)!!! 	 																																																										(16)		If	the	mean	and	the	standard	deviation	are	stated	daily	this	means	that	we	set	ℎ	equal	to	ten	if	we	wish	to	calculate	the	10-day	VaR	and	ES	(Dowd,	2005).				
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3.3.2	T-DISTRIBUTION	Hull	 (2015)	 explains	 that	 the	 assumption	 of	 normality	 is	 a	 major	 drawback	 of	 the	parametric	 approaches	 since	market	 variables	 tend	 to	 have	 heavier	 tails	 than	what	 the	normal	 distribution	 accommodates.	 The	 assumption	 of	 normality	 therefore	 leads	 to	 the	estimates	of	VaR	being	too	 low.	Mabrouk	and	Saadi	(2012)	argue	that	the	assumption	of	normality	is	unrealistic	and	leads	to	a	bias	in	the	estimate	of	VaR	A	possible	 solution	 to	 accommodate	 the	excess	kurtosis	 is	 according	 to	Dowd	 (2005)	 to	use	 a	 t-distribution	 instead	 of	 assuming	 normality.	 The	 t-distribution	 however,	 has	 a	major	drawback.	Since	it	can	fail	to	regard	constraints	on	maximum	possible	losses	and	as	a	 consequence	 to	 this	 it	 might	 produce	 too	 high	 estimates.	 Because	 of	 this	 the	 t-distribution	should	be	avoided	when	estimating	risk	at	very	high	confidence	levels.	When	 the	degrees	 of	 freedom	 in	 the	 t-distribution	become	 large	 it	 converges	 towards	 a	normal	distribution.	This	is	reflected	in	the	formula	for	VaR	under	a	t-distribution	below.	As	the	degrees	of	 freedom	(𝑣)	becomes	 larger	the	quantile	(𝑡!,!)	approaches	𝑧! 	and	 !!!! 	approaches	one.	Consequently	 the	estimation	of	VaR	under	 t-distribution	approaches	 its	equivalent	under	normality	(Dowd,	2005).	According	 to	 Dowd	 (2005)	 VaR	 can	 be	 estimated	 with	 a	 t-distribution	 through	 the	following	equation.			
							𝑉𝑎𝑅! = µ + !!!! 𝜎𝑡!,!	 																																																										(17)	
	Where	µ	and	σ	represents	the	mean	and	standard	deviation.	𝑣	the	degrees	of	freedom	and	𝑡!,!	represents	the	quantile.		An	estimate	for	ES	can	according	to	Nilsson	(2017)	be	obtained	with	the	help	of	equation	18.		
																																																				𝐸𝑆! = µ + !!!! 𝜎 !!"#∗ !!,!!!! !!!!,!!!!! 	 																															(18)	
19		
Where	𝑓!"#∗ 𝑡!,! 	represents	the	probability	density	function	for	a	standardized	t-distributed	variable.		These	estimates	can	be	scaled	for	another	holding	period	according	to	the	following	adjustments.	 	 		
																													𝑉𝑎𝑅!! = ℎµ + ℎ !!!! 𝜎𝑡!,!	 	 			(19)	
																																																	𝐸𝑆!! = ℎµ + ℎ !!!! 𝜎 !!"#∗ !!,!!!! !!!!,!!!!! 	 																															(20)	
	3.5	NON-PARAMETRIC	APPROACHES	Non-parametric	approaches	aim	to	estimate	the	risk	measures	of	interest	without	having	to	make	any	strong	distributional	assumptions.	Instead	of	assuming	a	distribution	for	the	losses	 non-parametric	 approaches	 uses	 the	 empirical	 distribution	 to	 estimate	 risk	measures.	This	approach	therefore	relies	on	the	near	future	being	similar	to	the	past,	from	which	we	gather	our	sample	from.	Because	of	this	we	have	to	decide	if	we	believe	the	past	data	to	be	a	good	approximation	of	 the	 future	period	which	we	are	 looking	 in	 to	(Dowd,	2005).		
3.5.1	BASIC	HISTORICAL	SIMULATION	Historical	 simulation	 is	 the	most	 popular	 approach	 to	 calculate	 both	 VaR	 and	 ES	 (Hull,	2015).	According	to	Perignon	and	Smith	(2010)	73	%	of	 international	commercial	banks	such	as	Nordea,	Wells	Fargo,	Rabobank	and	National	Australia	Bank,	which	disclose	their	method	to	calculate	VaR	state	that	they	use	historical	simulation.	 Inui	and	Kijima	(2005)	further	states	that	historical	simulation	is	popular	when	determining	VaR	due	to	classical	parametric	methods	assumption	of	normal	distribution,	which	is	unable	to	capture	the	fat	tails	in	portfolio	distributions.		The	historical	simulation	uses	past	data	on	market	variables	to	estimate	what	will	happen	in	 the	 future.	 	 By	 collecting	 data	 on	 past	 movements	 in	 market	 variables	 we	 obtain	 a	number	of	different	scenarios	of	what	can	happen	 in	the	next	period	(Hull,	2015).	Dowd	(2005)	 describes	 the	 calculation	 of	 VaR	 and	 ES	 through	 historical	 simulation	 by	 the	following	 simple	 example.	 If	 we	 have	 1000	 days	 of	 data	 on	 losses,	 our	 VaR	 with	 a	
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confidence	level	of	95	%	becomes	the	51st	largest	loss	in	the	sample.		The	ES	for	the	same	confidence	level	is	the	average	of	the	50	largest	losses.		According	to	Hull	(2015)	the	one	day	estimates	of	VaR	and	ES	can	be	adjusted	for	another	time	horizon	by	the	following	application.			
																																																																𝑉𝑎𝑅!! =  ℎ ∗ 𝑉𝑎𝑅! 	 	 																														(21)																																																																				𝐸𝑆!! =  ℎ ∗ 𝐸𝑆! 																																																																	(22)		A	problem	with	the	historical	simulation,	as	explained	by	Odening	and	Hinrichs	(2003),	is	due	 to	 discrete	 jumps	 in	 the	 tails	 of	 the	 distribution.	 The	 empirical	 loss	 distribution	 is	smooth	around	 the	mean	but	since	 there	are	 few	extreme	values	 in	 the	sample,	 the	VaR	estimate	 becomes	 sensitive	 to	 changes	 in	 the	 data	 sample.	 Another	 problem	 that	 arises	with	historical	 simulation	 is	 that	 it	becomes	 impossible	 to	predict	events	 that	are	worse	than	 the	 largest	 loss	 in	 the	 sample	 at	 hand.	 Hull	 (2015)	 argues	 that	 the	 Historical	Simulation	relies	on	that	recent	history	serves	as	a	good	guide	of	what	will	happen	in	the	future.	The	problem	however,	is	that	this	is	not	always	the	case.			Extreme	Value	Theory	could	be	used	to	solve	the	problems	arising	from	discrete	jumps	in	the	 tail	 and	 not	 considering	 losses	 larger	 than	 in-sample	 losses	 (Odening	 &	 Hinrichs,	2003).	In	order	to	make	the	historical	simulation	to	better	predict	the	future,	newer	loss	observations	could	be	given	a	 larger	weight	 in	the	sample	(Hull,	2015).	Another	possible	solution	 is	 to	 incorporate	volatility	changes	 in	 the	Historical	Simulation,	 this	approach	 is	also	 intended	 to	 incorporate	more	 current	 information	 in	 the	 simulation	 (Hull	&	White,	1998).		This	thesis	does	not	intend	to	find	the	best	model	for	estimating	risk.	Instead	the	research	focuses	on	the	differences	in	the	Basel	regulation,	which	makes	particular	risk	estimation	models	less	interesting.	Therefore	the	Basic	Historical	Simulation	will	be	used.	3.4	EXPONENTIALLY	WEIGHTED	MOVING	AVERAGE	Mabrouk	 and	 Saadi	 (2012)	 argue	 that	 financial	 time	 series	 shows	 certain	 stylized	 facts	such	 as	 volatility	 clustering.	 They	 therefore	 state	 that	 any	 sensible	 risk	measure	 should	account	 for	 this.	 According	 to	 Hull	 (2015)	 the	 exponentially	 weighted	 moving	 average	(EWMA)	approach	is	desirable	since	it	only	requires	us	to	store	a	rather	small	amount	of	
21		
data.	We	only	need	the	current	estimate	of	the	variance	and	the	most	recent	value	of	the	market	variable	that	we	are	studying.	The	weighting	scheme	in	the	EWMA	process	leads	to	the	following	formula.																																																												𝜎!! = 1 − 𝜆 𝑢!!!! + 𝜆𝜎!!!! 		 																														(23)			𝑢!	represent	 the	 returns	 that	 are	 weighted	 with	 1 − 𝜆 .	 The	 risk	 management	 group	RiskMetrics	database	 sets	𝜆	equal	 to	0.94	 for	daily	data	 in	 the	model	 (Maboruk	&	 Saadi,	2012).	 Through	 the	 process	 in	 the	 equation	 above	 we	 can	 follow	 changes	 in	 volatility	(Hull,	2015).		According	 to	 Dowd	 (2005)	 volatility	 clustering	 should	 be	 accounted	 for	 when	 using	 a	parametric	model.	Therefore	𝜎!!	will	be	used	in	equations	13-20.		 	
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CHAPTER	4:	DATA	AND	METHODOLOGY		
This	 chapter	will	 describe	 the	methodology	 applied	 in	 the	 thesis	 to	make	 the	 process	 used	
more	 comprehensible	 and	 transparent.	 There	 are	 obvious	 limitations	 in	 the	 approach	 and	
assumptions	used	in	the	thesis.	These	are	made	clear	as	to	why	the	specific	approach	used	is	
the	 best	 regarding	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 thesis.	 Lastly	 three	 different	 steps	 are	 performed	 in	
order	to	be	methodically	accurate	and	avoid	biased	results.	4.1	ASSUMPTIONS	AND	LIMITATIONS	Since	the	research	studies	one	asset	at	 the	time,	 the	 full	set	of	risk	 factors	will	equal	 the	reduced	set	of	risk	factors.	This	leads	to	the	ratio	between	the	full	and	reduced	set	of	risk	factors	being	equal	 to	one	(eq.	3	and	4).	 	According	 to	Bank	 for	 international	settlement	this	assumption	will	not	significantly	distort	the	analysis	(BIS,	2014).		The	 research	 uses	 three	 different	 indices	 as	 background	 for	 the	 research.	 These	will	 be	assumed	 to	 be	 sufficiently	 representative	 for	 their	 respective	 asset	 classes	 in	 order	 to	make	 this	 research	 valuable.	 In	 this	 study	 the	 indices	 will	 represent	 three	 different	portfolios	 that	 lay	 the	 foundation	 for	 the	 performed	 research.	 If	 data	 on	 financial	institutions	trading	portfolios	was	available	this	would	have	made	a	valuable	contribution	to	 this	 research.	 Considering	 this,	 it	 is	 of	 importance	 to	 regard	 the	 arbitrariness	 of	 the	chosen	data	when	evaluating	the	results.		4.2	DATASET	This	research	will	use	three	different	indices	in	order	to	perform	the	proposed	tests.	In	the	first	part	of	the	research,	in	which	the	effect	of	fatter	tails	in	financial	returns	is	evaluated,	the	 large	 cap	 stock	 index	 S&P	 500	 is	 utilized.	 In	 the	 second	 and	 the	 third	 part	 of	 the	research	two	additional	indices	are	included.	These	are	the	small	cap	index	S&P	600	and	S&P	500	High	Yield	Corporate	Bond	index.		All	 data	 is	 retrieved	 through	 Datastream	 (Table	 2)	 and	 roughly	 3000	 observations	 are	obtained	for	each	index.	Since	Datastream	does	not	automatically	account	for	non-trading	days,	 these	have	been	 removed	manually	 from	 the	data	 in	order	 to	only	 include	 trading	days.	The	time	period	spans	between	the	beginning	of	2005	and	the	end	of	2016	for	the	first	part	of	the	research.	In	the	second	and	third	part	of	the	research,	the	same	timeframe	will	 be	 studied.	 However,	 the	 capital	 charge	 will	 only	 be	 calculated	 between	 2009	 and	2016.	This	 is	since	the	stressed	period	was	found	to	occur	between	the	end	of	2007	and	2008.						
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Table	2.	Thomson	Reuters	Datastream	 		 	Equity	Indices	 Code	S&P	500	Large	Cap	 S&PCOMP	S&P	600	Small	Cap	 SP06SVA	S&P	500	High	Yield	Bond	Index	 SP5HYBI		 		In	order	to	calculate	VaR	and	ES	the	return	has	been	calculated.	The	research	will	utilize	the	one	day	return	(eq.	24)	as	well	as	the	10-day	overlapping	return	(eq.	26).	Both	returns	are	thereafter	transformed	to	losses	according	to	equations	25	and	27.		
													𝑟! = !!!!!!!!!!! ∗ 100	 	 																																(24)																																																																				𝑙! = −𝑟!	 	 							 					(25)																																																																	𝑟!!" = !!!!!!!"!!!!" ∗ 100	 	 																																(26)																																																																		𝑙!!" = −𝑟!!"	 	 	 					(27)		Table	3	displays	the	descriptive	statistics	of	S&P	500	for	the	daily	loss	data.	Most	notable	is	perhaps	 that	 the	data	exhibits	a	 skewness	and	kurtosis.	For	a	normal	distribution	 the	mean	and	standard	deviation	can	according	to	Dowd	(2005),	amount	to	any	values,	which	exception	of	the	necessity	of	a	positive	standard	deviation.	However	it	has	the	skewness	is	0	and	the	kurtosis	should	be	equal	to	3.		As	seen	in	the	table	the	kurtosis	amounts	to	11.45	and	 the	 distribution	 have	 a	 positive	 skewness.	 This	 therefore	 implies	 that	 the	 losses	inhibit	a	distribution	with	fat	tails.								
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Table	 3.	 Descriptive	 statistics	 daily	 losses	
S&P	500		 S&P	500		Mean	 -0.0279	Standard	deviation	 1.2313	Min	 -11.5800	Max	 9.0350	Skewness	 0.0921	Kurtosis	 11.4553		As	can	be	seen	in	Diagram	1,	which	displays	the	daily	losses	of	S&P	500	between	2005	and	2016,	 there	 is	 one	 period	 of	 distinctively	 high	 losses.	 This	 is	 the	 period	 between	 the	middle	 of	 2008	 and	 the	 beginning	 of	 2009.	 Since	 there	 are	 periods	 of	 low	 volatility	followed	by	periods	of	higher	volatility	the	index	also	seem	to	exhibit	volatility	clustering.	This	effect	will	be	accounted	for	when	comparing	VaR	and	ES	using	parametric	estimation	approaches	but	not	when	applying	a	historical	simulation.		
	Table	4	displays	the	descriptive	statistics	for	the	10-day	overlapping	losses.	The	kurtosis	is	noticeably	 high	 for	 the	 S&P	 500	 HY	 Corporate	 Bond	 Index,	 while	 lower	 for	 the	 two	remaining	indices.	In	addition	to	this	all	indices	have	a	positive	skewness.	This	implies	that	all	 three	 indices	 have	 fat	 tails,	 which	 is	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 empirical	 evidence	
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regarding	financial	returns.	The	largest	losses	(Max)	in	all	three	samples	gives	an	idea	of	how	high	 the	estimates	of	VaR	and	ES	will	be	 since	 this	data	will	be	used	 in	a	historical	simulation.	In	addition	to	this	the	standard	deviation	is	considerably	lower	for	S&P	500	HY	Corporate	 Bond	 Index.	 However,	 the	 standard	 deviation	 can	 be	 an	 inadequate	measure	when	dealing	with	non-normal	distributions	according	to	Dowd	(2005).	Therefore	we	will	not	draw	any	conclusions	from	the	varying	standard	distributions.			
Table	4.	Descriptive	statistics	10-day	losses		 S&P	500		 S&P	600	 S&P	500	HY	Bond	Index	Mean	 -0.2397	 -0.3287	 -0.0475	Standard	deviation	 3.0724	 3.9958	 1.4417	Min	 -16.3798	 -20.0292	 -10.8757	Max	 24.9866	 27.8918	 15.2219	Skewness	 1.0815	 0.7056	 1.5950	Kurtosis	 6.8694	 4.4547	 23.9704			Diagrams	2,	3	 and	4	depict	 the	10	day	 losses	 for	 the	 three	 indices.	The	 same	pattern	as	with	the	daily	losses	can	be	noted	here	as	well.	S&P	500	and	S&P	600	show	signs	of	higher	volatility,	which	also	can	be	seen	 in	 the	standard	deviation	 in	 table	4.	These	 two	 indices	have	experienced	large	losses	in	the	period	between	the	end	of	2011	and	the	beginning	of	2012.		
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	4.3	PERFORMED	RESEARCH		
4.3.1	THE	CHANGE	OF	VAR	TO	ES	This	part	of	the	research	aims	to	evaluate	how	VaR	and	ES	can	vary	if	a	distribution	with	heavier	 tails	 is	 applied.	 Since	 Dowd	 (2005),	 Hull	 (2015)	 and	 Fama	 (1965)	 argues	 that	financial	 data	 often	 have	 heavier	 tails	 than	 what	 the	 normal	 distribution	 has,	 it	 is	reasonable	to	test	this	in	order	to	see	the	effect	heavier	tails	has	on	the	estimation	of	the	two	 risk	 measures.	 In	 order	 to	 study	 the	 effect	 of	 heavy	 tails	 VaR	 and	 ES	 are	 first	calculated	 using	 a	 parametric	 estimation	 with	 normal	 distribution	 and	 thereafter	 a	 t-distribution	is	applied	to	the	calculations.		VaR	is	calculated	at	a	99%	confidence	level	and	ES	at	a	97.5%	confidence	level	on	the	S&P	500	index.	Both	VaR	and	ES	are	calculated	using	the	one-day	losses	and	the	sample	mean	included	 in	 the	observations	uses	 loss	data	over	 the	previous	year	 (252	days).	Since	 the	Basel	 regulation	 requires	 financial	 institutions	 to	 calculate	 the	 10-day	VaR	 and	ES,	 each	estimate	is	scaled	by	the	square	root	of	10	(see	eq.	15,	16,	19	and	20).		In	order	to	capture	market	conditions	the	standard	deviation,	obtained	through	an	EWMA	process,	 is	 included	 in	 the	 estimation.	 This	 means	 that	 we	 use	 the	 forecasted	 daily	volatility	 in	our	estimations	of	 the	risk	measures.	This	 test	stems	from	what	Hull	 (2015)	proposes,	that	VaR	and	ES	will	be	almost	exactly	equivalent	under	at	normal	distribution	when	these	confidence	levels	are	applied	but	can	vary	greatly	when	fatter	tails	applied.		
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In	 the	 EWMA	 process	 we	 have	 set	𝑢!	equal	 to	𝑙! − µ!"#$%! ,	 where	µ!"#$%!	is	 the	 yearly	mean	 of	 the	 losses.	 When	 estimating	 VaR	 and	 ES	 under	 the	 t-distribution,	 the	 first	 13	observations	showed	negative	degrees	of	freedom.	Because	of	this,	these	observations	are	approximated	with	the	values	obtained	using	the	normal	distribution.			
4.3.2	EFFECT	OF	LIQUIDITY	HORIZONS	The	second	part	of	 the	research	aims	to	study	 the	effect	of	how	the	new	way	of	 treating	liquidity	in	the	FRTB	affects	the	difference	between	VaR	and	ES.	In	order	to	do	this	a	non-parametric	 estimation	 of	 both	 VaR	 and	 ES	 is	 performed.	 The	 reason	 for	 leaving	 the	parametric	 approach	 behind	 is	 due	 to	 Perignon	 and	 Smith	 (2010)	 arguing	 that	 the	majority	 of	 (commercial)	 banks	 worldwide	 state	 that	 they	 use	 historical	 simulation	 in	their	estimation	of	VaR.	In	order	 to	 test	 the	new	way	of	 treating	 liquidity	all	 three	 indices	will	be	evaluated.	For	each	index	both	VaR	and	Expected	Shortfall	is	calculated.	In	the	FRTB	we	no	longer	apply	the	 square	 root	 of	 time	 since	 it	will	 no	 longer	 be	 permitted	 in	 the	 framework.	 S&P	500	contains	 large	 cap	 equity	 and	 therefore	 has	 a	 liquidity	 horizon	 of	 10-days	which	 is	 the	same	as	all	assets	carry	in	previous	regulation.	The	two	remaining	indices	carry	a	longer	liquidity	horizon	in	FRTB.	S&P	600	contains	small	cap	equity	and	therefore	has	a	liquidity	horizon	of	20-days	and	S&P	High	Yield	Corporate	Bond	index	carries	a	liquidity	horizon	of	60-days	in	the	FRTB.	To	incorporate	the	varying	liquidity	horizons	equation	9	is	used.	The	different	assets	used,	containing	different	liquidity	horizons	are	deliberately	chosen	to	see	the	effect	of	the	FRTB.	VaR	is	calculated	by	all	losses	over	the	99%	and	ES	is	calculated	as	the	average	of	the	2.5%	largest	losses	in	the	sample.	In	order	to	be	consistent	with	Basel	regulation	and	calculate	the	10-day	VaR	and	ES	the	10-day	overlapping	return	is	used	which	is	then	transformed	to	losses	(eq.	26	and	27).		 	 	
4.3.3	CAPITAL	CHARGE		The	 third	 and	 last	 part	 of	 the	 research	 is	 based	 on	 the	 calculations	 performed	 in	 the	second	part.	Calculations	of	VaR	and	ES	using	the	market	risk	capital	charge	under	Basel	II,	Basel	II.5	and	the	FRTB	are	performed	(see	eq.	1,	2	and	7).		Since	 the	calculation	of	capital	charge	 for	both	Basel	 II.5	and	 the	FRTB	 is	calibrated	 to	a	stressed	period	this	period	is	identified	for	each	index.	This	is	done	by	finding	the	largest	loss	 that	 has	 occurred	 between	 to	 2007	 and	 today,	 which	 is	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	quantitative	standards	 in	 the	FRTB.	After	 this	 loss	 is	 identified	a	VaR	and	ES	estimation,	which	includes	this	loss	is	calculated.	This	specific	estimation	is	referred	to	as	the	stressed	
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VaR	and	stressed	ES.	In	this	research	the	period	between	the	end	of	2007	and	the	end	of	2008	is	found	to	be	the	most	stressed	for	all	assets.		Finally,	the	capital	charge	under	the	three	different	regulations	is	calculated	separately	for	the	three	different	 indices.	The	multipliers	(ms	and	mc)	will	be	set	to	a	minimum	in	each	calculation	 of	 capital	 charge.	 This	 means	 that	 the	 multiplier	 is	 set	 equal	 to	 3	 in	 the	calculation	for	Basel	II	and	Basel	II.5.	The	minimum	in	the	FRTB	is	1.5	that	consequently	is	used	in	this	research	as	well.	The	non-modelable	factor,	SES	will	not	be	considered	since	there	are	none	present	in	the	sample	and	since	there	are	uncertainties	of	how	to	use	this	factor.	 Lastly,	 since	 we	 are	 only	 studying	 one	 asset	 at	 the	 time	 the	 reduced	 set	 of	 risk	factors	 equals	 the	 full	 set	 of	 risk	 factors	 the	 IMMC	 will	 be	 equal	 to	 ES,	 calibrated	 to	 a	stressed	period.	The	FRTB	capital	charge	is	then	compared	with	the	capital	charge	from	Basel	II	and	II.5	to	see	 if	 there	 are	 any	differences	between	 these	 risk	measurements.	As	previously	 stated,	Basel	 II	 is	 based	 solely	 on	 VaR	meanwhile	 Basel	 II.5	 use	 stressed	 periods	 and	 sVaR	 to	manage	capital	requirement.			 	
30		
CHAPTER	5:	RESULTS	AND	ANALYSIS		
The	 results	 are	 presented	 in	 the	 following	 order,	 firstly	 the	 change	 from	 VaR	 to	 ES	 with	
presence	 of	 fat	 tails	 is	 evaluated.	 	 Thereafter	 the	 results	 of	 the	 different	 liquidity	 horizons	
that	are	displaying	differences	between	the	different	assets	and	horizons.	Lastly	the	capital	
requirements	 under	 Basel	 II,	 Basel	 II.5	 and	 the	 FRTB	 for	 the	 three	 assets	 with	 varying	
liquidity	horizons	are	analyzed.	These	three	tests	are	thereafter	concluded	and	the	findings	
are	highlighted.	Lastly	future	research	within	the	area	is	suggested.	5.1	THE	CHANGE	OF	VAR	TO	ES	The	first	test	describes	how	the	different	distributions	are	behaving	when	calculated	for	VaR	and	ES	respectively	within	the	different	distributions.	The	calculations	are	based	on	the	S&P	500	large	cap	index.		
	When	 VaR	 and	 ES	 are	 calculated	 using	 a	 normal	 distribution	 they	 amount	 to	approximately	the	exact	same	values	as	seen	in	Diagram	5.		This	result	corresponds	to	our	hypothesis	regarding	the	equality	between	VaR	at	a	99	%	confidence	level	and	ES	at	a	97.5	%	confidence	level	under	a	normal	distribution.	Note	however	that	this	result	is	expected	due	to	the	different	confidence	levels	forcing	the	estimates	to	be	close	to	equal.	The	main	concern	in	this	test	lies	in	the	difference	between	the	measures	when	the	t-distribution	is	applied.	
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Diagram	5.	 																								Normal	distribuFon	
VaR	99%	-	10-day		 ES	97.5%	-	10-day	
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As	can	be	seen	in	Diagram	5	there	is	quite	a	lot	of	variability	in	both	measures	during	the	studied	 time	 period.	 The	 period	 with	 the	 highest	 VaR	 and	 ES	 is	 in	 2009.	 Since	 the	estimations	for	this	period	is	based	on	the	previous	252	days	the	high	value	stems	from	a	period	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 Considering	 that	 this	 period	 is	 likely	 to	 have	 experienced	large	losses	and	high	volatility	it	is	reasonable	that	both	the	ES	and	VaR	estimates	are	high.	Since	 we	 have	 included	 an	 EWMA	 model	 in	 the	 calculations	 the	 effect	 of	 volatility	clustering	is	accounted	for.			
	Hull	(2015)	argues	that	ES	can	be	considerably	larger	since	fatter	tails	than	the	normal	is	applied,	 which	 also	 was	 our	 hypothesis.	 As	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 Diagram	 6	 there	 are	 some	difference	between	 the	 two	 risk	measures,	 but	only	 to	 a	 small	 extent.	This	 result	 shows	that	the	presence	of	fat	tails	in	the	variable	does	not	seem	to	cause	any	major	differences	in	the	risk	measures	for	this	specific	index.	Note	however	that	the	VaR	estimate	is	higher	than	ES	during	some	days,	which	contradicts	the	intuition	from	Hull.			The	 reason	 for	 the	 small	 amount	 of	 difference	 between	 VaR	 and	 ES	 can	 be	 due	 to	 the	different	 confidence	 levels	 used.	 When	 the	 same	 confidence	 level	 is	 used	 for	 both	measures	ES	 is	always	 larger	 than	VaR.	 If	 the	most	extreme	 losses,	or	 the	 losses	beyond	VaR,	are	not	considerably	high	this	can	cause	ES	to	become	lower	than	VaR.				
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Diagram	6.	 	 	t-distribuFon	
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5.2	EFFECT	OF	LIQUIDITY	HORIZONS	The	 second	 test	 describes	 how	 different	 liquidity	 horizons	 affect	 the	 values	 of	 ES	compared	 to	 VaR	 which	 applies	 to	 a	 10-day	 holding	 period.	 The	 FRTB	 uses	 ES	 which	incorporates	 varying	 liquidity	 horizons,	 ranging	 from	 10-days	 up	 to	 120-days.	 The	liquidity	horizons	are	sorted	into	five	different	asset	classes,	where	the	liquidity	horizons	used	in	the	thesis	are	10-days,	20-days	and	60-day	liquidity	horizons	(see	Appendix).		When	evaluating	ES	with	different	liquidity	horizons	there	will	be	three	diagrams,	starting	with	the	most	liquid	asset,	the	S&P	500	large	cap	index	with	a	liquidity	horizon	of	10	days.	Thereafter	 the	 S&P	 600	 small	 cap	 index,	 which	 carries	 a	 20	 day	 liquidity	 horizon	 will	follow	 and	 lastly	 the	 S&P	 500	 high	 yield	 bond	 index	 with	 60-day	 liquidity	 horizon	 is	presented.	All	VaR	calculations	are	made	with	a	99	%	confidence	and	all	ES	calculations	are	made	with	a	97.5%	confidence	level,	in	accordance	with	regulation.			
		Diagram	 7	 is	 providing	 information	 about	 the	 S&P500	 large	 cap	 index	 that	 carries	 no	liquidity	horizon-punishment	since	it	is	in	the	category	that	is	deemed	most	liquid	with	a	10-day	liquidity	horizon.		No	apparent	pervading	difference	between	VaR	and	ES	can	be	seen	for	this	asset.	Both	VaR	and	ES	uses	a	10	day	liquidity	horizon	and	therefore	the	differences	seen	in	the	diagram	
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Diagram	7. 	 	S&P	500	LargeCap		
VaR	99%	-	10-day	 ES	97.5%	-	10-day	
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are	 most	 likely	 to	 come	 from	 the	 differences	 in	 the	 measures	 themselves.	 There	 are	however,	two	periods	where	there	are	clear	differences	between	ES	and	VaR.	During	the	periods	2009-2010	and	2012-2013	ES	distinctly	exceeds	VaR.		Since	ES	 considers	 the	whole	 right	 tail	 of	 the	distribution	while	VaR	merely	 considers	 a	quantile	 point	 there	 will	 be	 differences,	 especially	 if	 losses	 in	 the	 right	 tail	 are	considerably	high.	Therefore	the	differences	between	the	risk	measures	are	most	likely	to	stem	from	large	losses,	i.e.	considerable	extreme	values	during	the	estimation	periods	for	the	two	measures.			
		Diagram	8	provides	 information	about	 the	S&P	600	small	 cap	 that	compared	 to	 the	S&P	500	large	cap	carries	punishment	since	the	liquidity	horizon	is	now	extended	to	20-days	in	the	FRTB.	Consequently	 it	 is	deemed	as	 less	 liquid	than	the	category	addressed	with	10-day	 liquidity	 horizon.	 Similarities	 exist	 with	 Diagram	 7	 where	 the	 two	 most	distinguishable	periods	are	the	same	as	in	Diagram	8.	Compared	 to	 S&P	 500	 there	 is	 an	 apparent	 shift	 in	 VaR	 and	 ES,	where	 ES	 has	 a	 higher	value	than	VaR	through	the	whole	period.	The	FRTB	framework	consider	specific	risks	in	terms	of	liquidity	in	assets	meanwhile	VaR	assumes	the	same	liquidity	for	all	instruments,	which	 results	 in	 ES	 to	 be	 higher	 for	 a	more	 illiquid	 asset.	 This	 highlights	 the	 important	impact	of	liquidity	horizons.		
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Diagram	8.	 																							S&P	600	SmallCap		
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	Diagram	9	 is	providing	 information	about	 the	S&P	500	high	yield	corporate	bond	 index.	The	bond	represents	the	highest	liquidity	horizon	in	the	thesis	with	a	liquidity	horizon	of	60-days	and	therefore	also	carries	the	largest	punishment.		As	in	the	case	with	S&P	600,	this	even	more	illiquid	asset	has	generated	a	clear	difference	between	VaR	and	ES.	The	value	of	ES	 is	higher	 than	VaR	through	the	whole	period.	This	gives	 further	 evidence	 for	 the	 FRTB	 treating	more	 illiquid	 assets	 as	 considerably	more	risky.		There	has	been	a	rise	in	the	distance	between	VaR	and	ES	when	comparing	Diagrams,	7,	8	and	 9.	 Even	 though	 VaR	 has	 a	 higher	 confidence	 level	 compared	 to	 ES,	 ES	 shows	considerably	 higher	 values	 for	 the	 two	 more	 illiquid	 assets.	 Since	 there	 is	 no	 major	difference	 between	 the	 VaR	 and	 ES	 for	 the	 S&P	 500	 index,	 it	 is	 most	 likely	 that	 the	difference	in	the	two	remaining	assets	stems	from	the	higher	liquidity	horizon.							
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Diagram	9.																	S&P	500	HY	Corporate	Bond	Index	
VaR	99%	-	10	day	 ES	97.5%	-10	day	
35		
5.3	CAPITAL	CHARGE	This	last	section	compares	the	different	assets	minimum	capital	requirements	for	market	risk.	For	each	asset	 the	minimum	capital	 requirement	 is	 calculated	under	Basel	 II,	Basel	II.5	and	the	FRTB.	 In	accordance	with	the	regulation,	VaR	 is	always	calculated	at	a	99	%	confidence	level	while	ES	is	calculated	at	a	97.5	%	confidence	level.		
		In	Diagram	10	we	see	that	for	the	large	cap	equity	index	S&P	500	the	capital	charge	under	Basel	 II.5	 is	 invariably	 the	 highest	 while	 the	 capital	 charges	 for	 the	 FRTB	 and	 Basel	 II	regulation	lies	closer	to	each	other	and	at	a	constantly	lower	level.	This	result	corresponds	back	 to	 Bank	 for	 international	 Settlements	 (2014)	 expectations	 regarding	 moving	 to	 a	single	risk	measure	calculated	at	a	lower	confidence	level.	This	property	of	the	FRTB	was	thought	 to	cause	the	capital	requirement	 to	decrease.	Since	Basel	 II.5	relies	on	both	VaR	and	Stressed	VaR	it	is	reasonable	that	the	capital	charge	is	high.	Specifically	since	S&P	500	holds	the	shortest	 liquidity	horizon	of	the	studied	assets.	One	of	the	major	forces	behind	driving	 the	 capital	 charge	 upwards	 is	 absent	 since	 the	 liquidity	 horizon	 is	 10-days	 and	there	is	no	punishment.	Another	result	that	is	apparent	is	that	the	capital	charges	under	both	Basel	II	and	Basel	II.5	shows	signs	of	being	pro-cyclical	while	the	capital	charge	under	the	FRTB	is	constant	over	the	whole	period.	This	 feature	provides	evidence	 for	 the	FRTB	 to	be	 successful	 in	being	
0	
20	
40	
60	
80	
100	
120	
2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	 2015	 2016	
Value	($)	
Year	
Diagram	10.															S&P	500	LargeCap	-	Capital	Charge	
Basel	II	 Basel	II.5	 FRTB	
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less	 pro-cyclical,	 which	 was	 stated	 as	 a	 desirable	 trait.	 This	 makes	 the	 FRTB	 more	predictable	and	the	other	models	less	so.	However	even	though	the	FRTB	proves	to	move	towards	a	more	sophisticated	framework,	considering	and	sorting	different	risk	levels	that	corresponds	 with	 different	 liquidity	 horizons	 there	 are	 concerns	 of	 the	 complexity	 of	implementing	this	framework.	An	important	factor	to	address	is	the	non-modelable	assets	that	are	still	a	big	part	of	the	FRTB	estimations,	which	are	not	accounted	for	in	this	thesis.	This	 follows	with	 the	 BCBS´s	 study	with	 the	 hypothetical	 portfolio	 exercise	where	 they	found	 it	 difficult	 to	 incorporate	 non-modelable	 assets	 as	well.	 How	 this	 could	 affect	 the	model	would	be	 speculative	assumptions	and	 is	not	 something	 that	would	 contribute	 in	the	thesis.	The	only	thing	we	can	state	is	that	the	non-modelable	assets	will	have	an	effect	on	the	model	as	a	whole.		
		Diagram	11	based	on	S&P	600	small	cap	index	show	that	when	looking	at	an	asset	with	a	longer	 liquidity	 horizon	 the	 capital	 charge	 under	 the	 FRTB	 is	 driven	 upwards.	 This	illustrates	 that	 the	 inclusion	of	 liquidity	horizons	 seemingly	have	an	 important	effect	on	the	capital	charge.			
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The	same	appearance	regarding	the	cyclicality	as	with	S&P	500	can	be	seen	for	this	asset.	The	capital	charge	under	the	FRTB	is	constant	 through	time	while	 the	VaR	based	capital	charges	show	some	cyclicality.	The	effect	of	the	double	capital	charge	in	Basel	II.5	(see	eq.	2)	is	clearly	visible.			
		The	 different	 capital	 charges	 for	 S&P	 HY	 Corporate	 Bond	 Index	 are	 quite	 different	compared	to	the	two	other	assets	(Diagram	12).	Here	the	capital	charge	under	the	FRTB	is	the	 highest	 during	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 studied	 time	 period.	 Since	 S&P	 High	 Yield	 Bond	Index	 carries	 the	 longest	 liquidity	 horizon	 this	 result	 correspond	 to	 the	 expectation	 in	Bank	 for	 international	 Settlements	 (2014)	 where	 the	 inclusion	 of	 different	 liquidity	horizons	was	thought	to	drive	the	capital	charges	upwards.		We	note	however	that	during	the	initial	period	the	capital	charges	under	Basel	II	and	II.5	are	 both	 higher	 than	 the	 requirement	 in	 the	 FRTB.	 Since	 the	 initial	 capital	 requirement	stems	from	a	period	of	significant	stress	it	is	hardly	surprising	that	the	values	are	high.	It	is	also	important	to	note	that	the	requirement	under	the	FRTB	constantly,	through	the	whole	time	period,	is	calibrated	to	this	specific	stressed	period.			
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The	longer	the	liquidity	horizons	are,	the	more	effect	of	the	FRTB	framework	is	shown	in	form	of	capital	requirements	as	seen	in	diagrams	10,	11	and	12.	One	could	argue	that	the	capital	requirement	in	the	FRTB	is	too	high	in	diagram	12,	when	compared	with	Basel	II	and	 II.5.	 Though	 considering	 that	 less	 liquid	 assets	 put	 on	 a	 lot	 more	 risk	 it	 might	 be	reasonable	 to	 find	 the	FRTB	 to	be	as	high	as	 it	 is	 for	a	 liquidity	horizon	of	60-days.	The	FRTB	add	the	concern	for	the	assets	liquidity	meanwhile	Basel	II	and	II.5	do	not	account	for	the	difference	in	liquidity	among	assets.	Since	the	capital	charge	for	both	S&P	500	and	S&P	600	that	contains	assets	in	form	of	equity	is	lower	than	Basel	II.5.	This	corresponds	to	the	study	from	BIS	(2014)	that	also	proved	equity	to	be	subject	to	lower	capital	charge.	As	we	see	in	the	diagrams	10,	11	and	12	the	capital	charge	under	the	FRTB	capital	charge	show	no	signs	of	cyclicality.	Since	 the	capital	 requirement	 in	 the	FRTB	relies	on	a	single	risk	metric	 calibrated	 to	 a	 stressed	 period	 this	 result	 is	 reasonable.	 A	 change	 in	 capital	requirement	 under	 the	 new	 proposed	 regulation	 is	 in	 fact	 driven	 by	 entering	 a	 new	stressed	 period,	 which	 in	 turn	 later	 causes	 a	 change	 in	 the	 capital	 requirement.	 With	regards	to	this	the	FRTB	shows	signs	of	being	successful	in	being	less	pro-cyclical.		One	 thing	 that	 is	 noticeable	 is	 that	 Basel	 II	 and	 Basel	 II.5	 are	 based	 on	 the	 same	calculations	(eq	1	and	2).	The	difference	is	that	Basel	II.5	is	enhanced	by	a	constant	in	form	of	sVaR.	Comparing	diagram	10,	11	and	12	we	see	that	Basel	II.5	takes	on	a	high	value	in	liquid	 assets	meanwhile	 in	more	 illiquid	 assets	 takes	 on	 a	 lower	 value	when	 compared	with	 the	 FRTB.	 The	 FRTB	 has	 the	 reverse	 effect	 of	 a	 lower	 value	 in	 liquid	 assets	 and	 a	higher	value	in	illiquid	assets	(Diagram	10,	11	and	12).	This	 shows	 that	 Basel	 II.5	 assigns	 a	 high	 capital	 charge	 independent	 of	 liquidity	 in	 the	assets	 considered.	Meaning	 it	 assigns	 high	 capital	 charge	 even	 though	 the	 assets	 can	be	liquidated	easily	compared	to	the	FRTB	which	considers	the	liquidity	in	assets,	assigning	lower	capital	charge	to	a	more	liquid	asset.								
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CHAPTER	6:	SUMMARY	AND	CONCLUSION	The	research	cannot	prove	any	major	differences	between	VaR	and	ES	when	fat	tails	are	present.	Since	VaR	in	some	cases	was	shown	to	exceed	ES	under	a	t-distribution	it	does	not	correspond	to	our	hypothesis.	When	 looking	 into	 the	 difference	 in	 how	 to	 treat	 liquidity	 in	 the	 FRTB	 and	 previous	regulation,	the	research	show	evidence	of	discrepancies	between	the	regulations.	The	new	amendment	 incorporated	 in	 the	FRTB	 that	 forces	 financial	 institutions	 to	 treat	assets	 as	having	different	 liquidities	causes	the	ES	to	be	higher	compared	to	VaR	for	more	 illiquid	assets.	This	result	corresponds	to	our	hypothesis.		Considering	the	capital	charges	 in	the	FRTB	was	 low	for	the	more	 liquid	assets	and	high	for	the	illiquid	assets	the	inclusion	of	the	liquidity	horizon	in	the	FRTB	show	signs	of	being	an	important	factor	in	the	new	regulation.	The	main	argument	for	the	capital	requirement	under	the	FRTB	to	often	be	lower	than	the	current	regulations	requirement	is	moving	to	a	single	 risk	 metric	 rather	 than	 two.	 Another	 plausible	 explanation	 is	 the	 use	 of	 a	 lower	confidence	 level.	 As	 proven	 by	 the	 discrepancies	 between	 the	 capital	 charge	 in	 the	different	 assets	 it	 seems	as	 the	new	way	of	 treating	 liquidity	 in	 assets	 is	 the	main	 force	behind	 causing	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 capital	 charge	 in	 the	 new	 proposed	 regulation.	 This	result	 corresponds	 to	 our	 hypothesis	 regarding	 higher	 capital	 charge	 for	 more	 illiquid	assets.	The	 research	 indicates	 that	 the	 increased	 liquidity	horizons	 incorporated	 in	 the	FRTB	 is	likely	to	have	a	major	impact	for	financial	institutions.	This	is	clearly	illustrated	when	the	diagrams	for	S&P	500,	S&P	600	and	S&P	500	HY	Corporate	bond	Index	are	compared.	When	 evaluating	 these	 results	 it	 is	 of	 importance	 to	 regard	 the	 used	 set	 of	 data.	 It	 is	perhaps	 most	 important	 to	 note	 that	 this	 research	 has	 included	 three	 of	 five	 possible	liquidity	horizons.	The	two	liquidity	horizons	that	have	been	left	out	are	40	and	120-days.	It	 has	 been	 shown	 that	 a	 longer	 liquidity	 horizon	 causes	 the	 capital	 charge	 to	 increase.	These	two,	relatively	long,	liquidity	horizons	are	therefore	also	likely	to	cause	an	increase	in	the	minimum	capital	requirement	compared	to	previous	regulation.		Considering	 that	 the	 research	 has	 left	 out	 the	 liquidity	 horizons	 of	 120	 and	40-days	we	cannot	 conclude	 the	 same	 result	 as	 BIS	 (2015).	 However	 the	 research	 in	 the	 thesis	 has	found	evidence	that	longer	liquidity	horizons	drive	the	capital	charge	upwards.	Therefore	an	inclusion	of	the	two	excluded	horizons	is	plausible	to	generate	the	same	result	as	BIS	(2015).		
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A	 cause	 for	 concern	 when	 implementing	 the	 FRTB	 is	 the	 pro-cyclicality	 of	 previous	regulation.	 This	was	 something	 discussed	 in	 Basel	 II.5	 as	well.	 	 The	 research	 found	 the	FRTB	 capital	 requirement	 to	 be	 constant	 through	 time	 while	 the	 other	 two	 capital	requirements	showed	signs	of	being	more	pro-cyclical.		To	summarize,	this	research	has	found	some	important	factors	in	the	FRTB	that	will	affect	minimum	 capital	 requirements	 for	 market	 risk	 within	 the	 financial	 institutions.	 Most	notable	was	 the	new	way	of	 treating	 liquidity	 in	assets.	However	 there	are	some	 factors	that	were	not	included	in	the	thesis	that	can	have	an	important	impact	in	the	form	of	non-modelable	assets.	We	conclude	that	we	have	found	results	that	indicate	important	impacts	of	the	FRTB	but	cannot	conclude	that	these	will	be	valid	in	a	fully	operated	model.	
SUGGESTED	RESEARCH	This	 study	 could	 be	 replicated	 for	 another	 dataset.	 If	 access	 to	 a	 financial	 institutions	trading	desk	was	 accepted	 there	would	be	 a	 larger	 variety	 of	 instruments	 that	 could	be	included.	 This	would	 result	 in	 a	 broader	 and	more	 general	 result.	 However	 this	 type	 of	research	might	prove	 to	be	hard	 since,	 as	 previously	 stated,	 even	banks	were	unable	 to	fully	include	non-modelable	risk	factors	in	the	calculation.		More	 illiquid	assets	will	be	 subject	 to	a	higher	Expected	Shortfall	 compared	 to	Value-at-Risk	because	of	 the	 inclusion	of	 longer	 liquidity	horizons	 in	 the	FRTB.	This	might	 cause	financial	institutions	reluctant	towards	including	illiquid	assets	in	their	trading	books	and	this	 in	 turn,	could	generate	a	reallocation	of	 illiquid	assets	 in	 the	 financial	sector.	Due	to	this	 possible	 outcome,	 the	 allocation	 of	 assets	 after	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 FRTB	becomes	an	 interesting	 field	 to	 study.	There	are	growing	 concerns	 for	how	 the	 financial	institutions	 will	 cope	 with	 the	 increase	 in	 the	 minimum	 capital	 requirements	 within	illiquid	assets	where	the	two	foremost	concerns	are	shadowbanking	and	how	the	financial	institutions	will	be	able	to	keep	the	revenue	streams.	These	would	be	interesting	areas	to	explore	when	the	FRTB	is	fully	implemented.				 	
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APPENDIX			Risk	factor	category	 N	 Risk	factor	category	 N	Interest	rate	 10	 Equity	price	(small	cap):	volatility		 60	Interest	rate:	unspecified	currencies		 20	 Equity:	other	types	 60	Interest	rate:	volatility	 60	 FX	rate:	specified	currency	pairs		 10	Interest	rate:	other	types		 60	 FX	rate:	currency	pairs	 20	Credit	spread:	sovereign	(IG)	 20	 FX:	volatility		 40	Credit	spread:	sovereign		(HY)		 40	 FX:	other	types	 40	Credit	spread:	corporate	(HY)		 40	 Energy	and	carbon	emissions	trading	price	 20	Credit	spread:	corporate	(HY)		 60	 Precious	metals	and	non-ferrous	metals	price	 20	Credit	spread:	volatility		 120	 Other	commodities	price	 60	Credit	spread:	other	types	 120	 Energy	and	carbon	emissions	trading	price:	volatility		 60	Equity	price	(large	cap)	 10	 Precious	metals	and	non-ferrous	metals	price:	volatility		 60	Equity	price	(small	cap)	 20	 Other	commodities	price:	volatility		 120	Equity	price	(large	cap):	volatility	 20	 Commodity:	other	types	 120	Source:	Basel,	Minimum	capital	requirements	for	market	risk	(2016b)				
